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Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes.
EX PARTE CHETWYND, RE MULOCK.
A person threatening a petitioner to publish concerning her a statement of
facts, unless her petition were withdrawn-Held guilty of contempt of court,
and sentenced to pay a fine of 3001.

July 19.-Ballantine, Serjt. (Hannen with him), moved on
the part of Mrs. Blanche Chetwynd, a petitioner for dissolution
of marriage, for a rule nisi for an attachment against T. Mulock
for contempt of court, in writing and sending to the petitioner

the following letter:" Stafford, July 16, 1864.
ccMadam,-I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter.
I pity you from my heart; you are terribly deceived, and your
crafty law advisers have fostered your deception. You seem unaware of the abyss opening before you ; however, I must act as
befits a Christian man, to whom an appeal has been made; and
I now inform you, that if, on or before Wednesday next, the 20th
inst., your suit in the Court of Divorce be not withdrawn, I will,
on my own responsibility, apart from Mr. Chetwynd or any one
else, publish the full truth of the case, founded upon my own
various communications with your own friends, and accompanied
with a statement of facts concerning yourself from before your
marriage up to the present time, borne out by irrefragable documents.
"I am, Madam, your obedient servant,
" T. MULOCK

" Mrs. Blanche Chetwynd."
SIR JAMES P. WILDE, JUDGE ORDINARY.-The affidavit of
Mrs. Chetwynd discloses an attempt by a third person to prevent
her from laying her case before the court by threats of bringing
her into disgrace and disrepute. A rule nisi will, therefore, be
granted.
July 26.-Mr. Mulock appeared in person to show cause
against the rule, and said he did not intend to threaten Mrs.
Chetwynd, nor to treat the court with contempt; but when asked
by the Judge Ordinary, whether he would promise not to publish
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the statement which he had threatened to publish, he refused to
give any such promise.
The Judge Ordinary suspended his judgment until the 29th
July, that Mr. Mulock might have time to retract his threat; but
on that day, Mr. Mulock still refusing to promise not to publish
the statement,
The JUDGE ORDINARY said-Then it only remains for the
court to pronounce judgment. [After reading the letter above
set out, his Lordship continued:] From the pressure of this
threat Mrs. Chetwynd seeks protection, "and she claims the right
to approach this court free from all restraint or intimidation ; it
is a right that belongs to all suitors. Mr. Mulock has appeared
to show cause against the imputation thus made against him. He
did not deny the fact that he sent the letter, and although he disclaimed all desire to threaten the petitioner, he distinctly reiterated his intention to make the publication referred to. Mr.
Mulock, therefore, in the face of the court, practically adheres
to the threat he has made. No one can doubt that the very offering of such a threat to a suitor in this court for such a purpose,
is in itself, and quite independently of its subsequent fulfilment,
a contempt of court. In Shaw vs. Shaw, 2 Swab. & T. 519, the
late Sir 0. Oresswell so decided, if, indeed, authority were
needed. I own I was surprised, that when the legal effect of
what he had done was pointed out by me to Mr. Mulock, be did
not express himself prepared at once to retrace his steps, and to
cease from further interference with Mrs. Ohetwynd's suit; and
the more so, as it appeared from his own statement in court that
he had no interest whatever in the matter, and only a very recent
acquaintance with Mrs. Chetwynd. Had Mr., Mulock, under
these circumstances, been content to give the court an assurance
that he would go no further in his endeavor to intimidate Mrs.
Chetwynd, the court might properly have taken no further notice
of this most improper letter. All this I intimated to him the
other day, and I gave him the opportunity of considering the
matter and consulting his friends. The result is, that he still
adheres to the determination expressed in his letter, and refuses
all assurance that he will desist from executing his menace. The
court has no alternative but to adjudge him guilty of a contempt,
and to order him for the same to pay a fine of 3001. The future
is in Mr. Mulock's own hands. If he persists in the course which
he says he has marked out for himself as a Christian, and by act
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or deed, by writing or publishing, makes any further attempt to
stand between Mrs. Chetwynd and her free access to this court,
I wish him to understand that he will subject himself to further
punishment by fine or imprisonment, or both. If, on the other
hand, being satisfied that he is acting illegally, he should hold
his hand and submit to the authority of the court, I shall be prepared to attend to any application that he may make next term
for the remission of this fine ; and for that purpose I shall direct
the officer of the court not to estreat the fine, until the fourth
day of next term.
Nov. 3.-Mr. Mulock appeared in person, and said he had
come to the conclusion that he had been wrong, &c. ; he had not
published, and would not publish, a syllable respecting the case.
The JUDGE ORDINARY directed that the fine should not be
estreated, but that the costs of the application for an attachment
must be paid by Mr. Mulock.
Dec. 13.-Mr. Mulock came into court, and made a long stateWent, the purport of which was that he declined to pay the costs
as taxed.
The JUDGE ORDINARY, referring to his judgment as given
above, said, that as Mr. Mulock refused to pay the costs incurred
by his conduct, he had no course but to order that the fine of
8001. be estreated.
We have inserted the foregoing case
here because we apprehend the profession in this country may not be entirely
aware of the extent of the shield which
is thrown around courts of justice by
the common law of England by the way
£ punishment of any infringement of
its inviolable freedom and independence, and that of all its officers, ministers, and suitors. The common impression, as well among the profession as
elsewhere, in this country, seems to be,
that power to punish for contempt of a
court of justice extends only to the protection of the court, its process, and
officers. It is not generally supposed
that the suitors in a court of justice can
claim any immunity or privilege by
reason of being suitors there. If any
of their rights are violated by threats

or slanders, or in any other mode, the
courts are open, they may implead the
offenders.
We believe very few persons, even
professional men, ever dream of resisting a threat to publish the proceedings
of a trial, or of the facts connected
with the transaction out of which the
suit arose, by an appeal to the summary
jurisdiction of hle court to punish for
contempt, although it has been done
here. And it seems that Mr. Mulock,
in the principal case before 'Mr. Justice
WILDE, the Judge Ordinary for Divorce and Matrimonial causes, was of
the same opinion, after being admonished by the court that lie was in error.
and that judgment must be rendered
against him unless lie gave some assu,
rance that he would stay his hand and
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not execute his threat. He seems to
have supposed that a disclaimer of all
intention of conducting himself disrespectfully towards the court, or to publish anything in regard to the subjectmatter of the suit pending before the
court, beyond the mere facts, without
extenuation, and "without setting down
aught in malice," was a course which
he might with the utmost propriety, in
the language of the learned judge,
"mark out for himself as a Christian."
And very possibly the majority of the
profession here would be inclined to
agree with the learned counsellor in
his sense of duty, and in regard to the
propriety of allowing himself to be
shaken from his firm purpose by any
counter intimations which he might regard in the nature of threats by the
court. But we beg all such, if any
there be, to consider that the shield
which the law throws around the suitors in a court of justice, for the time
bringing them under the same broad
canopy of perfect freedom and liberty,
even as regards just accusation, with
the court itself, is a part of the inestimable birthright of English and American liberty, whose palladium may be
said to reside rather in the courts of
justice than in a free press or in any
other one thing, since all other safeguards of liberty are of little value,
after we have ceased to maintain the
inviolability of a free and pure and independent judiciary.
What is the privilege of applying to
a court of justice for the redress of
wrongs worth to any man if his antagonist is at liberty to threaten the destruction of his life or property, or the
bringing his character in scandal before the public, or himself before a
military commission to answer for political offences, or before the ecclesiastical courts exposed to spiritual cen-

sures, unless he will desist from the
prosecution of his suit?
We have always felt an invinciblq
repugnance to all summary proceedings
before courts of justice to punish counsel, or others, for personal offences
against the magistrates presiding there.
If their own conduct and character will
not effectually shield them from such
personal insults, nothing which they
could do.by way of punishment for the
contempt would be likely to have any
greater effect. The judge, in all such
cases, stands too much in the light of
hearing and deciding his own cause, to
give the decision much moral vRight."
The public sympathy in such cases is
sure to be with the offender, however
justly condemned. We have always
regarded the rule of forbearance in
such cases as the wisest, and in the end
the most successful.
But where the judge is called to
punish anintermeddling suitor, or other
person, for attempting to tamper with
witnesses, jurymen, or any of the protug~s of the court, whether by way of
influence, bribery, or intimidation, he
need feel no such reluctance. Let him
be firm, but forbearing. Let him give
fair opportunity for explanation and
exculpation, but not be drawn from his
purpose by sham excuses or hbllow pretences. The case before us seems to
have been conducted in excellent spirit,
and in all respects to have been worthy
of imitation.
We had occasion to discuss the question of the mode of procedure in such
cases, and need not repeat it here, in
Ex parteLangdon, 25 Vermont Rep. 680,
where the authorities are examined
with some care upon the point of convictions for contempt, when the offence
is not committed in the presence of the
court. It was there held that the proceeding for contempt must be regarded

